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Abstract—Entities in the Internet, ranging from individuals
and enterprises to service providers, face a broad range of
epidemic risks such as worms, viruses, and botnet-driven attacks.
Those risks are interdependent risks, which means that the
decision by an entity to invest in security and self-protect affects
the risk faced by others (for example, the risk faced by an
individual decreases when its providers increases its investments
in security). As a result of this, entities tend to invest too little in
self-protection, relative to the socially efﬁcient level, by ignoring
beneﬁts conferred on by others.
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentives
to entities in the Internet so that they invest at a socially efﬁcient
level. In particular, we ﬁnd that insurance is a powerful incentive
mechanism which pushes agents to invest in self-protection. Thus,
insurance increases the level of self-protection, and therefore the
level of security, in the Internet. As a result, we believe that
insurance should be considered as an important component of
risk management in the Internet.
I. INTRODUCTION
The infrastructure, the users, and the services offered on
the Internet are all subject to a wide variety of risks, both
malicious (such as denial of service attacks, intrusions of
various kinds, phishing, worms and viruses, etc) and non-
intentional (such as overloads or denial of service caused by
ﬂash crowds). The approach typically taken to manage those
risks has been to accept the loss when it occurs, and in parallel
to develop and deploy methods to reduce the likelihood of loss,
reduce the impact of the risk and therefore reduce the severity
of the damages. In practice, this has led to a vast industry,
and a large scale effort in the research community, centered
around tools and techniques to detect threats and anomalies
and to protect the network infrastructure and its users from
the negative impact of those anomalies, along with efforts in
the area of security education in an attempt to minimize the
risks related to the human factor.
Comparatively very little attention has been focused, and
work been done, on an alternative approach to handling risks,
namely the transfer of risk to another entity through contract
or hedging. A widely known way to do that in many areas of
modern life is through insurance. There, the risk is transferred
to an insurance company, in return for a fee which is the
insurance premium.
The Internet has become a fundamental infrastructure of
modern economies, yet ”Internet insurance” is still in its
infancy. Cyberinsurance, or the insurance of computer risks
in general (without much focus on network environments
speciﬁcally) was proposed more than 10 years ago [16] but
popularized only recently [25], [26]. The authors in [13],
[14] make the the economic case for insurance, arguing that
insurance results in higher security investments (and therefore
increases the global level of safety), that it encourages stan-
dards for best practices to be at the socially optimum level,
and that it solves a market failure (namely the absence of risk
transfer opportunity), and they see the emerging market for
cyberinsurance as a validation of the case they make in the
paper.
The market for cyberinsurance started in the late 90’s with
insurance policies offered by security software companies
partnering with insurance companies as packages (software +
insurance). The insurance provided a way to highlight the (sup-
posedly high) quality of the security software being sold, and
to deliver a ”total” risk management solution (risk reduction +
residual risk transfer), ratherthan the customary risk reduction-
only solution; see for examples solutions offered by Cigna
(Cigna’s Secure System Insurance) or Counterpane/Lloyd’s
of London [8]. More recently, insurance companies started
offering stand-alone products (e.g. AIG’s NetAdvantage [1]).
Reference [21] provides a recent and comprehensive descrip-
tion of the history and the current state of computer insurance.
Using insurance in the Internet raises a couple of chal-
lenging issues, caused by speciﬁc properties of the Internet
and other large scale networked systems. The ﬁrst challenge
is caused by correlations between risks, which makes it
difﬁcult to spread the risk across customers - a sizable fraction
of worm and virus attacks, for example, tend to propagate
rapidly throughout the Internet and inﬂict correlated damages
to customers worldwide [24], [31]. The second challenge is
because entities in the Internet face interdependent risks, i.e.
risks that depends on the behavior of other entities in the
network, and thus the reward for a user investing in security
depends on the general level of security in the network. In
this paper, we focus on interdependent risks such as those
caused by propagating worms, viruses or bot networks, where
damages can be caused either directly by a user, or indirectly
via the user’s neighbors.
Bot networks are now a prevalent form of malware with a
wide variety of malicious applications including spam, phish-
ing, distributed denial of service, click fraud, data harvesting,2
password cracking, online reputation inﬂation and adware
installation among others. We explore botnets in detail in
Section II-C.
Correlated and interdependent risks have only very recently
started being addressed in the literature [4], [5], [7], [12],
[15]. Reference [15] considers the situation of agents faced
with interdependent risks and proposes a parametric game-
theoretic model for such a situation. In the model, agents
decide whether or not to invest in security and agents face
a risk of damage which depends on the state of other agents.
They show the existence of two Nash equilibria (all agents
invest or none invests), and suggest that taxation or insurance
would be ways to provide incentives for agents to invest
(and therefore reach the ”good” Nash equilibrium), but they
do not analyze the interplay between insurance and security
investments. The model in [15] is extended in [12] to include
compulsory insurance offered by a monopolistic insurer.
A more general two-level model was developed and ana-
lyzed in [18] and [19]- there, one model describes the spread of
malware and another level the economic model for the agents.
However, that model did not include insurance. Its main
conclusion is that the agents invest too little in self-protection
relative to the socially efﬁcient level. A similar result is well-
known in public economics: in an economy with externalities,
the equilibrium outcomes is generally inefﬁcient [28], [20].
This fact seems very relevant to the situation observed on
Internet, where under-investment in security solutions and
security controls has long been considered an issue. Security
managers typically face challenges in providing justiﬁcation
for security investments, and in 2003, the President’s National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace stated that government action
is required where ”market failures result in under-investment
in cybersecurity” [30]. The main reason for this situation is
that the possible loss cannot be avoided completely by a self-
protection investment: a residual (indirect) risk remains. This
risk depends on the behavior of other agents. Those who invest
in self-protection incur some cost and in return receive some
individual beneﬁt through the reduced individual expected
loss. But part of the beneﬁt is public: the reduced indirect
risk in the economy from which everybody else beneﬁts.
The model in [18] and [19] allows to model these network
externalities and shows that a tipping phenomenon is possible:
in a situation of low level of self-protection, if a certain
fraction of the population chooses to invest in security, then it
can trigger a large cascade of adoption of security features.
Our work in this paper analyzes the conditions under which
insurance could encourage the agents to individually self-
protect and possibly leading to a cascading phenomenon of
adoption of self-protection. It builds in part on the models
of [12], [15], [18], [19] but differs from those because it
models all three desirable characteristics of an Internet-like
network, namely correlated risks, interdependent agents, and
a general model of a network with the realistic topology of
a sparse random graph, and it derives general results about
the state of the network and the behavior of the agents with
and without insurance being available. Our main result is that
without regulation insurance (in a competitive market or with
one monopoly) is not a good incentive for self-protection
and we provide possible rules to ensure viability of insurance
companies and increase the level of security of the network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce a model of agents subject to epidemic risks when
insurance in not available. In Section III, we augment the
model from Section II to include insurance, and we discuss the
interplay between self-protection and insurance. In Section IV,
we present our main results in the case of a general network,
subject to epidemic risks, in the presence of insurance. In
Section V, we prove the theorems behind our main results of
Section IV. In Section VI, we discuss our results and conclude
the paper.
II. A MODEL FOR EPIDEMIC RISKS WITHOUT INSURANCE
In this section, we consider the case of economic agents
(namely, agents that attempt to optimize some kind of utility
function) subject to epidemic risks, when insurance is not
available. We describe a model and give an example of
application: botnets. In the next section, we augment this
model to include an insurance market. We then solve that
model to obtain our main results for this paper.
Our models in this and the next section include two com-
ponents, so to speak: one component describes the economic
model of the agents, the other component describes the spread
of the security risk (worm or malware spread, virus attack...)
among the agents. We consider simple one-period probabilistic
models for the risk, in which all decisions and outcomes occur
in a simultaneous instant.
A. Economic model for the agents
We model agents using the classical expected utility model:
the decision maker who bears risk, maximizes some kind
of preference functional that evaluates the level of his sat-
isfaction. This functional is taken as his expected utility. We
assume that agents are rational and that they are risk averse,
i.e. their utility function is concave (see Proposition 2.1 in
[10]). Risk averse agents dislike mean-preserving spreads in
the distribution of their ﬁnal wealth. As explained below,
it is an essential assumption when dealing with problem of
insurance.
We denote by w the initial wealth of the agent. The risk
premium π is the maximum amount of money that one is
ready to pay to escape a pure risk X, where a pure risk X
is a random variable such that E[X] = 0. The risk premium
corresponds to an amount of money paid (thereby decreasing
the wealth of the agent from w to w − π) which covers the
risk; hence, π is given by the following equation:
u[w − π] = E[u[w + X]].
Each agent faces a potential loss ℓ, which we take in this
paper to be a ﬁxed (non-random) value. We denote by p the
probability of loss or damage. There are two possible ﬁnal
states for the agent: a good state, in which the ﬁnal wealth
of the agent is equal to its initial wealth w, and a bad state3
in which the ﬁnal wealth is w − ℓ. If the probability of loss
is p > 0, the risk is clearly not a pure risk. The amount of
money m the agent is ready to invest to escape the risk is
given by the equation:
pu[w − ℓ] + (1 − p)u[w] = u[w − m] (1)
We clearly have m > pℓ thanks to the concavity of u. We
can actually relate m to the risk premium deﬁned above: m =
pℓ+π[p;ℓ,w]. We will often use the simpliﬁed notation π[p] =
π[p,ℓ,w], when no confusion is possible.
An agent can invest some amount in self-protection. Each
agent has a binary choice regarding self-protection: if it
decides to invest in self-protection, we say that the agent is
in state S (as in Safe or Secure). If the agent decides not to
invest in self-protection, we say that it is in state N (Not safe).
If the agent does not invest, its probability of loss is pN. If it
does invest, for an amount which we assume is a ﬁxed amount
c, then its loss probability is reduced and equal to pS < pN.
In state N, the expected utility of the agent is pNu[w−ℓ]+
(1 −pN)u[w]; in state S, the expected utility is pSu[w −ℓ −
c]+(1−pS)u[w−c]. Using the deﬁnition of risk premium, we
see that these quantities are equal to u[w−pNℓ−π[pN]] and
u[w − c − pSℓ − π[pS]], respectively. Therefore, the optimal
strategy is for the agent to invest in self-protection only if the
cost for self-protection is less than the threshold
c < (pN − pS)ℓ + π[pN] − π[pS]. (2)
B. Epidemic risks for interconnected agents
Our model for the spread of the attack is an elementary
epidemic model. Agents are represented by vertices of a graph
and face two types of losses: direct and indirect (i.e. due to
their neighbors). We assume that an agent in state S has a
probability p− of direct loss and an agent in state N has a
probability p+ of direct loss with p+ ≥ p−. Then any infected
agent contaminates neighbors independently of each others
with probability q− if the neighbor is in state S and q+ if
the neighbor is in state N, with q+ ≥ q−.
Special cases of this model are examined in [18], where
q+ = q−, and in [22], where agents in state S are completely
secure and cannot have a loss, i.e. p− = q− = 0.
We assume that all agents have the same initial wealth w
and that the size of the possible loss is ﬁxed to ℓ (i.e. does
not depend if it is direct or indirect and is the same across the
population). We consider a heterogeneous population, where
agents differ only in self-protection cost. The cost of protection
should not exceed the possible loss, hence 0 ≤ ci ≤ ℓ. We
model this heterogeneous population by taking the sequence
(ci,i ∈ N) as a sequence of i.i.d. random variables indepen-
dent of everything else.The cost ci is known to agent i and
varies among the population.We will consider randomfamilies
of graphs G(n) with n vertices and given vertex degree [6].
All our results are related to the large population limit (n tends
to inﬁnity). In all cases, we assume that the family of graphs
G(n) is independent of all other processes.
We now explain how the equilibria of this game are com-
puted. Note that the stochastic process of the losses depends
on the state of the agent but her strategic choice given by (2)
depends on the probabilities of experiencing a loss in state
N and S. Clearly, the decision made by the agent depends
on the information available to her. As in [18] and [19], we
will assume that only a global information is available to the
agents. More precisely, if γ is the fraction of the population
investing in self-protection (in state S) then one can compute
pN,γ and pS,γ which are the correspondingprobabilities of loss
averaged over the population, conditionally on the decision to
invest in self-protection S or not N. We assume that these
quantities are known to each agent so that the decision to
invest in self-protection for agent i becomes
ci < cγ, (3)
with cγ = (pN,γ − pS,γ)ℓ + π[pN,γ] − π[pS,γ]. In particular,
we can now compute the fraction of population investing in
self-protection as a function of these pN,γ and pS,γ, so that the
equilibria of the game are given by a ﬁxed point equation, see
[18], [19] and [17] for a connection with the standard concept
in the economic literature of fulﬁlled expectations equilibrium.
C. An example: Botnets
We now show how our model captures the main features
of viruses, worms or botnets. The relevance of studying
botnets is accredited by the last Symantec Internet Security
Threat Report: “Effective security measures implemented by
vendors, administrators, and end users have forced attackers
to adopt new tactics more rapidly and more often. Symantec
believes that such a change is currently taking place in the
construction and use of bot networks. Between July 1 and
December 31, 2007, Symantec observed an average of 61,940
active bot-infected computers per day, a 17 percent increase
from the previous reporting period. Symantec also observed
5,060,187 distinct bot-infected computers during this period,
a one percent increase from the ﬁrst six months of 2007.”
A bot is an end-user machine containing software that
allows it to be controlled by a remote administrator called
the bot herder via a command and control network. Bots
are generally created by ﬁnding vulnerabilities in computer
systems, exploiting these vulnerabilities with malware and
inserting malware into those systems. The bots are then
programmed and instructed by the bot herder to perform a
variety of cyber- attacks. When malware infects an information
system, two things can happen: something can be stolen and
the infected information system can become part of a botnet.
When an infected information system becomes part of a botnet
it is then used to scan for vulnerabilities in other information
systems connected to the Internet, thus creating a cycle that
rapidly infects vulnerable information systems.
Our model is particularly well-suited to analyze such threats.
Recall that we deﬁned two types of losses: direct losses could
model the attack of the bot herder who infects machines when
he detects it lacks a security feature and then indirect losses
would model the contagion process taking place without the
direct control of the bot herder. Note that the underlying
graph would model the propagation mechanism as ﬁle sharing4
executables or email attachment. In particular it does not
necessary correspond to a physical network but it can also
be a social network.
Clearly our model is a very simpliﬁed model of botnets
observed on the Internet. However, security threats on the
Internet are evolving very rapidly and our model captures their
main features which are more stable.
III. MODEL FOR EPIDEMIC RISKS WITH INSURANCE
We now analyze the impact of the availability of insurance
on the level of investment in self-protection chosen by the
agent.
A. Interplay between insurance with full coverage and self-
protection
Consider ﬁrst the case when a fraction γ of the population
is in state S and an agent i such that Equation (3) is satisﬁed,
namely it is best for her to invest in self-protection. We assume
that the agent can choose between insurance with full coverage
at a cost ℘ and self-protection. Clearly if the agent chooses full
coverage, she will not spend money on self-protection since
losses are covered and the utility becomes u[w − ℘]. In the
case of optimal self-protection, the utility has been computed
above: u[w − ci − pS,γℓ − π[pS,γ]] since Equation (3) holds.
Hence the optimal strategy for the agent is to use insurance if
℘ − pS,γℓ − π[pS,γ] < ci (4)
We see that in this simple case, where only full insurance
is available, some agents who would have invested in self-
protection if there was no insurance, now take a full coverage
and do not invest any more in self-protection. In other words,
insurance with full coverage and ﬁxed premium is a negative
incentive to self-protection.
We will solve this issue in the sequel but before that, we
describe the model of the insurer. We assume that the insurer
is risk-neutral and maximizes expected proﬁt. In the case of
full coverage the expected proﬁt for the insurer is ℘ − pN,γℓ
times the fraction of population with a cost ci satisfying (4).
In particular, for the proﬁt to be positive, we need ℘ > pN,γℓ
and that there exists agents i such that
℘ < ci + pS,γℓ + π[pS,γ] ≤ pN,γℓ + π[pN,γ].
Now if there is only one monopolistic insurer, he will choose
℘ ∈ (pN,γℓ;pN,γℓ + π[pN,γ]) in order to optimize his proﬁt.
We will also consider the case where the insurance market is
perfectly competitive, in which case only insurers proposing
the premium ℘ = pN,γℓ will sell insurance and make zero
proﬁts. It corresponds to the conventional deﬁnitions of com-
petitive equilibrium which assume market clearing, zero proﬁts
and the existence of prices.
B. The basic insurance model
As explained above, the combination of insurance and
self-protection raises the problem of what is referred to as
moral hazard. Moral hazard occurs when agents or companies
covered by insurance take fewer measures to prevent losses
from happening, or maybe even cause the loss (and reap the
insurance beneﬁts from it). This happens if the insurer is
unable to observe the actions of the insured agent, which could
result in negligence by the latter.
As we will see if the premium does not depend on whether
or not the agent invests in self-protection, then insurance can
become a negative incentive to self-protection. This fact is
well-known in the economic literature and it is due to the
fact that insurance reduces the impact of a loss. Demand for
insurance and expenditures on self-protection are negatively
related. However, as Ehrlich and Becker [9] have shown,
market insurance and self-protection can complement in the
sense ’that the availability of the former could increase the
demand for the latter’, if the insurer can observe the protection
level of the insured (in practice, for the insurer to audit
self-protection practices and the level of care that the agent
takes to prevent the loss) and tie the premium to the amount
of self-protection. In order to raise the social level of self-
protection, the insurer may engage in premium discrimination.
In particular, he may design different contracts for different
risk types, relying on the policyholders’categorization: he may
offer a premium rebate for low risk agents, and/or he may
impose a premium loading for high risk agents and let agents
voluntarily decide whether or not to invest in self-protection.
The sequence of the considered game between the insurer and
its customers may then be seen as follows: at a ﬁrst stage, the
insurer offers appropriate contracts including a premium load-
ing and/or rebate. At a second stage, the customers chooses
a contract and decide simultaneously whether or not to invest
in prevention.
There is another solution to moral hazard problem: incom-
plete coverage against loss [27]. Incomplete coverage gives an
individual a motive to prevent loss by exposing him to some
ﬁnancial risk.
Our general model of insurance covers both cases and we
present it now: with insurance, agent’s income, in the event of
a loss is increased, while if there is no loss, it is reduced. To
an agent who invests in self-protection, the insurer offers the
premium ℘[S] and the (net) beneﬁt β[S] so that her income
in the two states, no loss and loss are: w − c − ℘[S] and,
w − c − ℓ + β[S].
To an agent who does not invest in self-protection, he offers
the premium ℘[N] = ℘[S]+x and the beneﬁt β[N] = β[S]−y.
We then consider two cases:
• if insurer has perfect information about the level of secu-
rity of the agents and thus we ignore possible problems
associated with moral hazard, then x and y are allowed
to be positive in which case it corresponds to a premium
penalty (loading).
• if insurer has no information about the level of security
of the agents, then we impose ℘[S] = ℘[N] = ℘ and
β[S] = β[N] by setting x = y = 0.
C. Epidemic risks for interconnected agents with insurance
We now explain how the equilibria of this game with
insurance are computed. We ﬁrst deﬁne the set of feasible5
contracts: those {℘[S],β[S],x,y} for which expected proﬁts
(for the insurer) are non-negative over the whole population,
i.e.
γ
￿
(1 − pS,γ)℘[S] − pS,γβ[S]
￿
+(1 − γ)
￿
(1 − pN,γ)℘[N] − pN,γβ[N]
￿
≥ 0,
which can be rewritten as:
℘[S](1 − pγ) − β[S]pγ (5)
+(1 − γ)(x(1 − p
N,γ) + yp
N,γ) ≥ 0,
where pγ = γpS,γ + (1 − γ)pN,γ is the probability of loss.
We will consider two cases:
• case (i): insurer observes with perfect accuracy the level
of self-protection of the agents and offers only full
coverage contracts: β = ℓ − ℘.
• case (ii): insurer does not observe the level of self-
protection of the agents and offers any insurance con-
tracts.
In case (i), note that because only full coverage is offered,
we have β[N] = β[S] − y = ℓ − ℘[S] − x = ℓ − ℘[N], so
that x = y. Hence the insurance contracts depend on only two
parameters: ℘[S] = ℘ and x and all other quantities are derived
from these parameters. In particular, if there is a monopolistic
insurer, his revenue with market clearing is given by (5):
R(γ,℘,x) = ℘ − ℓpγ + (1 − γ)x. (6)
Suppose a market with many risk neutral insurers being in
competition to attract customers and suppose insurers act so
as to maximize expected proﬁts. The only policies that will
survive in the market are those that yield zero expected proﬁts
to insurers and, given this constraint, the highest possible
expected utility to agents. Now consider an insurer offering
a contract with x > 0, then by lowering x, he will attract
more customers (in state N) and increases his proﬁt. As a
consequence, at the equilibrium we must have x = 0. Hence
if there is a competitive insurance market, we require that
x = 0 and R(γ,℘,0) = 0.
In case (ii), since x = y = 0, the insurance contracts depend
on only two parameters: ℘[S] = ℘ and β[S] = β. As in case
(i), if there is a monopolistic insurer, his revenue with market
clearing is
R(γ,℘,β) = ℘(1 − pγ) − βpγ. (7)
If there is a competitive insurance market, we require that
R(γ,℘,β) = 0.
Now the procedure to compute the equilibria of the game is
similar to the one described in Section II-B. For a fraction γ of
the population investing in self-protection (in state S), one can
compute the probabilities pN,γ and pS,γ. From these quantities
(known to the agents), we can predict the strategic behavior of
each agent, namely to invest or not in self-protection and/or to
take or not an insurance. In particular, we are able to compute
the fraction of population investing in self-protection as a
function of these pN,γ and pS,γ, so that the equilibria of the
game are given by a new ﬁxed point equation (see Section V
for a more formal treatment). In the case of a monopolistic
insurer, his revenue can be computed thanks to (6) or (7). In
the case of a competitive insurance market, only equilibria
satisfying the zero proﬁt condition are valid. In particular,
it is possible that equilibria with a monopolist insurer exist
whereas, no equilibrium exists in a competitive market.
Summary of notations:
• ci and ℓi = ℓ are the cost of self-protection and the
amount of loss for agent i.
• p+ > 0 is the probability of direct loss when not
investing in self-protection (state N).
• p− < p+ is the probability of direct loss when
investing in self-protection (state S).
• q+ is the probability of contagion in state S.
• q− ≤ q+ is the probability of contagion in state N.
• γ is the fraction of the population investing in self-
protection.
• when a fraction γ is in state S, pS,γ and pN,γ are the
respective probabilities of loss conditioned on being in
state S and in state N.
• pγ = γpS,γ + (1 − γ)pN,γ is the probability of loss
averaged over the whole population.
• an insurance contract is a couple of a premium and a
beneﬁt: insurer offers a contract (℘[S],β[S]) to agents
in state S and (℘[S] + x,β[S] − y) to agents in state
N:
– in case (i), there is no moral hazard and only full
coverage: β[S] = ℓ − ℘[S]. ℘[S] = ℘, x = y.
– in case (ii), there is moral hazard: x = y = 0.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
Humans are the weakest link in security but cannot be
directly programmed to perform. Rather their autonomy must
be respected as a design constraint and incentives provided
to induce desired behavior [2], [17], [29]. In this section we
answer the following fundamental questions:
1) what is the range of parameters of the insurance con-
tracts ensuring that the introduction of insurance cannot
decrease the level of self-protection in the network?
2) under which conditions can the introduction of insurance
increase the level of self-protection in the network?
Answering these questions is a crucial point in a possible
development of insurance markets for the Internet and its
users. Our model yet simple allows to get insights on the
limits and beneﬁts of insurance for such epidemic risks. It
also raises several issues (discussed in Section VI) concerning
a possible implementationof insurance viewed as a mechanism
to increase the adoption of security measures Internet-wide.
We say that insurance is a good incentive for self-protection
if for any fraction γ of the population investing in self-
protection, the incentive for any agent to invest in self-
protection increases when insurance is introduced. We now
consider different scenarios and their impact on the level of6
self-protection in the network. Proofs of the propositions are
given in Section V.
A. Competitive insurance market
Proposition 1: In cases (i) and (ii) and in a competitive
insurance market, insurance is not an incentive for self-
protection.
In case (ii), Proposition 1 shows that moral hazard is a
limit to insurance for epidemic risks, since there is an inverse
relationship between risk prevention and insurance coverage.
In this case, the level of risk prevention will be inefﬁcient.
Anticipating this low degree of prevention, insurers will raise
their premium rate, inducing policyholders to reduce their
coverage: no insurance can be an (inefﬁcient) equilibrium.
In case (i), there is no problem of moral hazard since
insurers can engage in premium discrimination but they will
actually not engage in such a premium discrimination. Sup-
pose, they did tie the premium to the amount of self-protection,
then an insurer could come into the market and offer an
insurance contract to agents in state S only. It is easy to see
that he will make a positive proﬁt because he will beneﬁt from
the low probability of loss for those agents and not bear the
costs needed to achieve this high level of security.
Our Proposition 1 sustains the following general claim:
Claim 1: Network externalities cannot be internalized in a
competitive insurance market.
This claim is also substantiated by [12]. Claim 1 shows
that there is a need for public intervention. A possibility is
the enforcement of norms for risk prevention. This is the case
for environmental risks in which ships transporting chemical
products have to satisfy several safety requirements that are
imposed by regulatory agencies. Automobile driving norms
are also standard as speed limits, alcohol-free driving... Note
that these norms are mostly organized by a regulatory agency
rather than by insurers. One reason is due to the combination
of negative externalities and limited liability [11]. If there
are more than one agency supervising the implementation of
norms, the information among the different agencies should
be pooled.
B. Monopolistic Insurer
We assume now that there is a risk-neutral monopolistic
insurer maximizing expected proﬁt:
Proposition 2: In cases (i) and (ii), a monopolistic insurer
is not a good incentive for self-protection.
It follows from the proof of this proposition that the fol-
lowing phenomenon occurs: starting form a situation without
insurance, the insurer attracts only agents in state S. Then
among this fraction of the population, the agents with the
highest cost for self-protection choose to take an insurance
without self-protection (even if the premium is higher).
Propositions 1 and 2 explain in part the actual situation
where cyberinsurance seems not to have ’taken off’. There
are various reasons and we will discuss some in Section VI.
But it seems reasonable to think that insurance can actually
take off only if it is a good incentive for self-protection,
otherwise losses will be very big and highly correlated among
the network, making the claims harder to reimburse. With
this point of view, the right question to ask is not anymore:
is insurance a good incentive for self-protection? but: what
would be a framework which would allow insurance to exist?
There is no such economic framework today (at least speciﬁc
to the Internet) and as a consequence cyberinsurance is still
in its infancy. The deﬁnition of such a framework is a vast
question which seems to be a promising research area. The
model designed in previous sections is our main contribution
to this research agenda. It allows to capture the main features
of the problem and is tractable enough to give some insights
on the way to alter the economic incentives in order to solve
the problem.
C. Insurance as a good incentive
In order for insurance to be a good incentive, we need to
ﬁnd the good rules to regulate the market. We explore this
issue now.
Proposition 3: If there is no moral hazard, there exists a
threshold t such that in a competitive insurance market where
the premium loading is forced to exceed t, then insurance is
an incentive to self-protection.
There is a simple way, to enforce such a rule thanks to a
tax: agents choosing not to invest in self-protection have to
pay a tax t. This argument substantiates the following claim:
Claim 2: Implementing a tax for individuals not investing
in self-protection could enable an insurance market for the
Internet and its users.
It might actually be technically possible to implement such
a tax system. However there is still an economic issue. A
collected tax should be returned to the agents for example by
refunding taxes equally to all users, otherwise the total cost
incurred to the network can actually be larger than without
tax. In other words, the social optimum is attained only
if the collected tax is returned to the network. Hence the
implementation of such a tax system should be able to return
some money or a good to the end users.
Our next proposition solves this issue and shows that if
insurance is provided by a monopolistic insurer who does
not maximize his expected proﬁt, then insurance is a good
incentive to self-protection. Moreover, there is no need to
return money to the agents, since the insurance contract can
be provided at a fair premium, meaning that the insurer makes
zero proﬁt.
Proposition 4: If there is no moral hazard, insurance pro-
vided at a fair premium to agents in state S is a good incentive.
Note that in all cases, there is a fundamental requirement,
namely the insurer should be able to observe the level of
self-protection of the agents. Both the cost and the potential
usefulness of observations of self-protection measures may
depend on when the observations are made, either ex ante,
when a policy is purchased or ex post, when a claim is
presented. We do not deal with this issue in this paper. Our
model deals with the case, where there is an exact observation
made by the insurer. But one could add some noise on this7
observation. Our main methodology will carry on but details
will change. In the case of moral hazard, when no observation
can be made by the insurer, the design of an insurance scheme
with good incentive is an open problem. This issue is left for
a future research.
V. MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS
A. General framework
In this section, we consider the case of Erd¨ os-R´ enyi graphs
G(n) = G(n,λ/n) on n nodes {0,1,...,n − 1}, where each
potential edge (i,j), 0 ≤ i < j ≤ n − 1 is present in the
graph with probability λ/n, independently for all n(n−1)/2
edges. Here λ > 0 is a ﬁxed constant independent of n. This
class of random graphs has received considerable attention in
the past. We refer to [18] and [19] to see how our results
extend to random graphs with asymptotic given degree. The
main features of the solution are still valid in these different
cases.
Following Proposition 1 of [19] (see also Section 4.1) we
deﬁne h(γ) as the unique solution in [0,1] of
h = 1 − γ(1 − p−)e−λq
−h − (1 − γ)(1 − p+)e−λq
+h.
Then, we deﬁne
pN,γ = 1 − (1 − p+)e−λqh(γ),
pS,γ = 1 − (1 − p−)e−λqh(γ).
By Proposition 4 of [18] or Section 3.3 of [19], we know
that these quantities are the asymptotics as n → ∞ of
the probabilities of loss conditioned on being in N and S
respectively, when the fraction of the population investing in
self-protection is γ.
Thanks to these quantities, we compute the utility for all
possible cases, for a ﬁxed γ:
• (I,S): the agent pays for insurance and invests in self-
protection, then her utility is given by
u
(I,S) = (1 − p
S,γ)u[w − ci − ℘[S]]
+pS,γu[w − ci − ℓ + β[S]]
= u[w − ci − p
S,γℓ − ζ],
where νS = ℘[S]−ℓ+β[S] and ζ = π[pS,γ;νS] +(1 −
pS,γ)℘[S] − pS,γβ[S].
• (I,N): the agent pays for insurance but does not invest
in self-protection, then her utility is given by
u(I,N) = (1 − pN,γ)u[w − ℘[N]]
+pN,γu[w − ℓ + β[N]]
= u[w − pN,γℓ − η],
where νN = ℘[N] − ℓ + β[N] and η = π[pN,γ;νN] +
(1 − pN,γ)℘[N] − pN,γβ[N].
• (NI,S): the agent does not pay for insurance but does
invest in self-protection, then her utility is given by
u(NI,S) = (1 − pS,γ)u[w − ci]
+p
S,γu[w − ℓ − ci]
= u[w − ci − pS,γℓ − π[pS,γ]].
TABLE I
UTILITY WITH INSURANCE AND SELF-PROTECTION
(I,S) u[w − ci − pS,γℓ − ζ]
(I,N) u[w − pN,γℓ − η]
(NI,S) u[w − ci − pS,γℓ − π[pS,γ]]
(NI,N) u[w − pN,γℓ − π[pN,γ]]
• (NI,N): the agent does not pay for insurance nor invests
in self-protection, then her utility is given by
u(NI,N) = u[w − pN,γℓ − π[pN,γ]].
The utility for all possible cases is summarized in Table 1.
The ﬁrst column denotes the choice made by an agent. It is
denoted by the pair (U,V ), where U = I means that the agent
pays for insurance and U = NI otherwise, and V = S means
that the agent invests in self-protection and V = N otherwise.
We see that if ζ < π[pS,γ], then (I,S) always dominates
(NI,S). For (I,S) to dominate (I,N), we need ci < (pN,γ−
pS,γ)ℓ + η − ζ. For (I,S) to dominate (NI,N), we need
ci < (pN,γ − pS,γ)ℓ + π[pN,γ] − ζ. For (I,N) to dominate
(NI,N), we need η < π[pN,γ]. For (NI,S) to dominate
(NI,N), we need the standard condition: ci < cγ = (pN,γ −
pS,γ)ℓ + π[pN,γ] − π[pS,γ]. We deﬁne
cγ[ζ,η] := (pN,γ − pS,γ)ℓ + min(η − ζ;π[pN,γ] − ζ).
so that if ζ < π[pS,γ], for ci < cγ[ζ,η], the strategy (I,S)
is dominant and if ζ ≥ π[pS,γ] and ci < cγ[ζ,η], then the
strategy (NI,S) is dominant. For ci > cγ[ζ,η], either (I,N)
or (NI,N) dominates. Note that in this last case, there is no
incentive to invest in self-protection. In other words, in the
presence of insurance, agent i will decide to invest in self-
protection if and only if ci < cγ[ζ,η]. This last relation has
to be compared to Equation (3).
In particular, from pN,γ,pS,γ,℘[S],β[S],x,y, we can now
compute the fraction f(pN,γ,pS,γ,℘[S],β[S],x,y) of the pop-
ulation investing in self-protection, namely the agents such that
ci < cγ[ζ,η]. Then, the possible equilibria are characterized by
the ﬁxed point equation: γ = f(pN,γ,pS,γ,℘[S],β[S],x,y).
B. Conditions for Insurance as a good incentive
We say that insurance is a good incentive for self-protection
if cγ[ζ,η] ≥ cγ for all γ. In words, it implies that for any
fraction γ of the population investing in self-protection, the
incentive for any agent to invest in self-protection increases
when insurance is introduced.
Then we have:
c
γ[ζ,η] ≥ c
γ ⇔
￿
π[pS,γ] ≥ ζ, and,
η − ζ ≥ π[pN,γ] − π[pS,γ]. (8)
We now look at the different cases studied.
C. Analysis of case (i)
Note that we have νN = νS = 0, ζ = ℘ − pS,γℓ and
η = ℘ + x − pN,γℓ. Hence Equation (8) becomes:
￿
℘ ≤ pS,γℓ + π[pS,γ], and,
x ≥ cγ. (9)8
In a competitive insurance market, we must have x = 0
which contradicts the second equation of (9) as soon as pN,γ >
pS,γ which is implied by p− < p+. Hence the ﬁrst part of
Proposition 1 follows.
We now look when insurance is a dominant strategy. For
(I,S) to be dominant, we need to have
ζ ≤ π[p
N,γ], and,
ci ≤ (pN,γ − pS,γ)ℓ + min(η − ζ;π[pN,γ] − ζ).
For (I,N) to be a dominant strategy, we need to have
η ≤ π[pN,γ], and,
ci ≤ (p
N,γ − p
S,γ)ℓ + η − π[p
S,γ], and,
ci ≥ (pN,γ − pS,γ)ℓ + η − ζ.
First assume that the insurer chooses η > π[pN,γ], then (I,N)
is never dominant and the insurer will attract only agents in
state S such that ci ≤ (pN,γ − pS,γ)ℓ + π[pN,γ] − ζ and the
proﬁt made by the insurer for any such customer is exactly ζ.
In particular, in a competitive market, we know that ζ = 0 and
hence agents with cγ < ci ≤ (pN,γ − pS,γ)ℓ + π[pN,γ] will
invest in self-protection, hence increasing the fraction of the
population in state S. In this case, insurance is an incentive
for self-protection. Note that
η > π[pN,γ] ⇔ ℘ + x − pN,γℓ > π[pN,γ]
⇔ x > (pN,γ − pS,γ)ℓ + π[pN,γ],
and Proposition 4 follows.
Now consider the case where the (monopolistic) insurer
chooses η ≤ π[pN,γ]. As a result we see that agents with
ci ≤ (pN,γ − pS,γ)ℓ + η − ζ choose (I,S) and provide
a revenue of ζ ≤ π[pN,γ] to the insurer and agents with
ci ∈ [(pN,γ − pS,γ)ℓ + η − ζ,(pN,γ − pS,γ)ℓ + η − π[pS,γ]]
choose (I,N) and provide a revenue of η to the insurer.
Hence we see that, the optimal choice for η for the insurer
is actually η = π[pN,γ] and then Proposition 3 follows.
D. Analysis of case (ii)
We have ζ = π[pS,γ] + (1 − pS,γ)℘ − pS,γβ and η =
π[pN,γ]+(1−pN,γ)℘−pN,γβ. Hence Equation (8) becomes:
￿
℘ + β ≤ 0, and,
(1 − pS,γ)℘ ≤ pS,γβ. (10)
Recall (7) that R(γ,℘,β) = ℘(1 − pγ) − βpγ.
In a competitive insurance market, we must have
R(γ,℘,β) = 0. However, we have
R(γ,℘,β) ≥ 0 ⇔ ℘(1 − p
γ) ≥ βp
γ,
and since pγ < pS,γ (for γ < 1), we see that it is in contra-
diction with the second equation of (10). The corresponding
statement of Propositions 1 for case (ii) follows.
The proof of Proposition 2 for case (ii) follows the same
argument as in previous section. In particular, it is always
optimal for the insurer to choose η = π[pN,γ] and then to
optimize ζ.The insurer now get a revenue (1−pN,γ)℘−pN,γβ
from the agents with ci ∈ [(pN,γ − pS,γ)ℓ + π[pN,γ] − ζ,cγ].
VI. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
In this work, we focused on quantifying the beneﬁts of
managing epidemic risks, such as those caused by the spread
of worms and viruses in the Internet, using insurance. Our
analysis leads us to conclude that insurance can be a powerful
mechanism to increase the level of self-protection, and there-
fore the overall security, in the network (see Propositions 3and
4). Furthermore, it appears to be an attractive proposition and
a growth opportunity for insurance companies since risks are
not decreasing but the importance of the Internet infrastructure
is increasing.
However, we also found that, moral hazard problem could
be a barrier for insurance (Proposition 1). Therefore, the
analysis suggests a winning combination, namely a regulated
market (so that insurance companies can prosper while still
offering fair premiums to agents) which provides a clear ben-
eﬁt (namely an overall increase in Internet security). Given the
beneﬁts of insurance, and the increasing strategic importance
of the Internet, it seems likely that insurance will play a role,
possibly a key role, in Internet security in the future.
However, we have found that mentioning Internet insurance
rapidly attracts comments about the uniqueness of the Internet
environment, and in particular questions around the estimation
of damages. The assumption is that estimating damages in the
Internet is so difﬁcult and fraught with peril that insurance
is not inevitable at all, but rather destined to remain a niche
or an oddity. We ﬁrst note that reliably estimating damages
is indeed an important task because it controls the proﬁt (or
the ruin) of the insurer and the incentives for agents to invest
in self-protection. Also, it is true that quantifying risks for
a good or an optimal premium value is difﬁcult because the
assets to be protected are intangible (such as a company stock
price), because damages might be visible only long after a
threat or an attack was identiﬁed (e.g. easter egg with timed
virus or exploit in a downloaded piece of software), because
risk changes can occur quickly (zero day attacks), and because
evaluating the insurability (and the level of protection) of
new and existing customers is likely to be a complex and
time intensive task. However, the insurance industry has been
dealing with those problems for decades or centuries in other
areas of life - if warships can be insured in time of war (as
indeed they can), it is difﬁcult to argue convincingly that
Internet risks and damages absolutely cannot be insurable.
Questions about damage estimation might also be the wrong
questions. A better question might be how to help insurers do
a better job, i.e. how the current Internet might be used to
help insurers do a better job of estimating damages, and how
to evolve the Internet or create a new design that will make
that job even easier. One way suggested by the discussion
above on estimating damages would be to develop metrics
and techniques for that purpose. Another, related way is to
develop metrics for the security related issues of interest. Some
interesting propositions have been made in that sense, for
example the cost to break metric described in [25], but we
believe this is an important area ripe for further research (see9
also [3]). Note that metrics of interest are not limited to core
security metrics such as cost to break, but need to be developed
for all relevant activities facing threats and risks.
We conclude by noting that deploying large scale insurance
solutions in the Internet raises several systems and architec-
tural issues. In particular, it will require new processes and
fresh approach to some Internet components. Insurance relies
heavily on authenticated, audited, or certiﬁed assessments of
various kinds to avoid fraud or other issues such as the moral
hazard examined earlier in the paper. This argues, along with
security logs and metrics, for effective and efﬁcient ways
to measure and report those metrics during the lifetime of
an insurance contract (for example, a declaration of security
investments and settings at signup time, possible audits while
the contract is effective, and a certiﬁed assessment post-
damage of the security settings and responses during the attack
or infection).
Finally, we believe that the design of insurance policies for
realistic Internet scenarios raises exciting research questions,
with opportunities for contributions that can impact the evo-
lution of the Internet and the evolution of the industry of risk
management on the Internet.
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